Regular papers

Andrew W. Appel, Princeton U, USA; Neophytos G. Michael, Princeton U, USA; Aaron Stump, Stanford U, USA; and Roberto Virga, Princeton U, USA
A trustworthy proof checker

Alessandro Armando and Luca Compagna, U Genova, Italy
Automatic SAT-compilation of security problems

Ernie Cohen, Microsoft Research Cambridge, UK
Proving protocols safe from guessing

Catherine Meadows, Naval Research Laboratory, USA
Identifying potential type confusion in authenticated messages

Graham Steel, Alan Bundy, and Ewen Denney; U Edinburgh, UK
Finding counterexamples to inductive conjectures and discovering security protocol attacks

Lujo Bauer, Jarred Ligatti, and David Walker; Princeton U, USA
More enforceable security policies

Sylvain Conchon, Oregon Health and Science U, USA
Modular information flow analysis for process calculi

Ralf Küsters, U Kiel, Germany
On the decidability of cryptographic protocols with open-ended data structures

Yu David Liu and Scott F. Smith, Johns Hopkins U, USA
A component security infrastructure

Kong-wei Lye and Jeannette M. Wing, Carnegie Mellon U, USA
Game strategies in network security

Christian Skalka and Scott F. Smith, Johns Hopkins U, USA
Static use-based object confinement